We present dcl-pc: a dynamic logic of delegation and cooperation. The logical foundation of dcl-pc is cl-pc, a logic for reasoning about cooperation in which the powers of agents ...
The core of a cooperative game contains all stable distributions of a coalition’s gains among its members. However, some games have an empty core, with every distribution being ...
— Over the past 50 years, much attention has been given to the Prisoner’s Dilemma as a metaphor for problems surrounding the evolution and maintenance of cooperative and altrui...
We continue the recent line of work on the connection between semidefinite programming-based approximation algorithms and the Unique Games Conjecture. Given any boolean 2-CSP (or...
Many multiagent domains where cooperation among agents is crucial to achieving a common goal can be modeled as coalitional games. However, in many of these domains, agents are une...
Yoram Bachrach, Evangelos Markakis, Ariel D. Proca...