We examine correlated equilibria in the recently introduced formalism of graphical games, a succinct representation for multiplayer games. We establish a natural and powerful rela...
Sham Kakade, Michael J. Kearns, John Langford, Lui...
We formulate the problem of computing equilibria in multiplayer games represented by arbitrary undirected graphs as a constraint satisfaction problem and present two algorithms. T...
Vishal Soni, Satinder P. Singh, Michael P. Wellman
Correlated equilibria are a generalization of Nash equilibria that permit agents to act in a correlated manner and can therefore, model learning in games. In this paper we define...
We give a novel proof of the existence of Nash equilibria in all finite games without using fixed point theorems or path following arguments. Our approach relies on a new notion i...
Noah D. Stein, Pablo A. Parrilo, Asuman E. Ozdagla...