We enforce information flow policies in programs that run at multiple locations, with diverse levels of security. We build a compiler from a small imperative language with locali...
The abstraction of cryptographic operations by term algebras, called Dolev-Yao models, is essential in almost all tool-supported methods for proving security protocols. Recently si...
Information-flow security policies are an appealing way of specifying confidentiality and integrity policies in information systems. Most previous work on language-based securit...
Abstract. We focus on the implementation and security aspects of cryptographic protocols that use Type 1 and Type 4 pairings. On the implementation front, we report improved timing...
Sanjit Chatterjee, Darrel Hankerson, Alfred Meneze...
We present the design and implementation of a compiler that, given high-level multiparty session descriptions, generates custom cryptographic protocols. Our sessions specify pre-a...