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FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 10 days ago
Truthful and Near-Optimal Mechanism Design via Linear Programming
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
Ron Lavi, Chaitanya Swamy
AAAI
2008
13 years 9 months ago
A Theory of Expressiveness in Mechanisms
A key trend in (electronic) commerce is a demand for higher levels of expressiveness in the mechanisms that mediate interactions. We develop a theory that ties the expressiveness ...
Michael Benisch, Norman M. Sadeh, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
ECAI
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
Addressing the Exposure Problem of Bidding Agents Using Flexibly Priced Options
Abstract. In this paper we introduce a new option pricing mechanism for reducing the exposure problem encountered by bidding agents with complementary valuations when participating...
Valentin Robu, Ioannis A. Vetsikas, Enrico H. Gerd...
AAMAS
2010
Springer
13 years 6 months ago
Evolutionary mechanism design: a review
Abstract The advent of large-scale distributed systems poses unique engineering challenges. In open systems such as the internet it is not possible to prescribe the behaviour of al...
Steve Phelps, Peter McBurney, Simon Parsons