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SIGECOM
2003
ACM
124views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
14 years 3 months ago
Coalitional games on graphs: core structure, substitutes and frugality
We study mechanisms that can be modelled as coalitional games with transferable utilities, and apply ideas from mechanism design and game theory to problems arising in a network d...
Rahul Garg, Vijay Kumar, Atri Rudra, Akshat Verma
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
Recommender systems: a market-based design
Recommender systems have been widely advocated as a way of coping with the problem of information overload for knowledge workers. Given this, multiple recommendation methods have ...
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, Nicholas R. Jennings
HICSS
2007
IEEE
141views Biometrics» more  HICSS 2007»
14 years 4 months ago
Second-Best Combinatorial Auctions - The Case of the Pricing-Per-Column Mechanism
One of the main contributions of classical mechanism design is the derivation of the Groves mechanisms. The class of Groves mechanisms are the only mechanisms that are strategy-pr...
Dirk Neumann, Björn Schnizler, Ilka Weber, Ch...
WINE
2007
Springer
182views Economy» more  WINE 2007»
14 years 4 months ago
Mechanism Design on Trust Networks
We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, ...
ATAL
2004
Springer
14 years 3 months ago
A Study of Limited-Precision, Incremental Elicitation in Auctions
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Alexander Kress, Craig Boutilier