In this paper we consider a common form of the English auction that is widely used in online Internet auctions. This discrete bid auction requires that the bidders may only submit...
Esther David, Alex Rogers, Jeremy Schiff, Sarit Kr...
Using a model of agent behavior based around envy-reducing strategies, we describe an iterated combinatorial auction in which the allocation and prices converge to a solution in t...
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions (ICA) have been getting increasing attention in computer science and economics, as they provide an efficient solution to resource allocation prob...
Alexander Pikovsky, Pasha Shabalin, Martin Bichler
The monopolist’s theory of optimal single-item auctions for agents with independent private values can be summarized by two statements. The first is from Myerson [8]: the optim...
Abstract. We give a simple characterization of all single-item truthrevealing auctions under some mild (and natural) assumptions about the auctions. Our work opens up the possibili...
Kamal Jain, Aranyak Mehta, Kunal Talwar, Vijay V. ...