We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
Sequential auctions are an important mechanism for buying/selling multiple objects. Existing work has studied sequential auctions for objects that are exclusively either common va...
S. Shaheen Fatima, Michael Wooldridge, Nicholas R....
This paper takes the first steps towards designing incentive compatible mechanisms for hierarchical decision making problems involving selfish agents. We call these Stackelberg p...
Existing task allocation algorithms generally do not consider the effects of task interaction, such as interference, but instead assume that tasks are independent. That assumptio...
This paper focuses on a task allocation problem, particularly in cases where the task is to find a solution to a search problem or a constraint satisfaction problem. If the searc...