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ATAL
2009
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
Characterizing false-name-proof allocation rules in combinatorial auctions
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner....
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sa...
IJAMC
2010
149views more  IJAMC 2010»
13 years 6 months ago
Deadline-Driven Auctions for NPC host allocation in P2P MMOGs
: This paper presents the design, implementation and evaluation of Deadline-Driven Auctions (DDA), a novel task mapping infrastructure for heterogeneous distributed environments. D...
Lu Fan, Philip W. Trinder, Hamish Taylor
CCS
2003
ACM
14 years 22 days ago
PPay: micropayments for peer-to-peer systems
Emerging economic P2P applications share the common need for an efficient, secure payment mechanism. In this paper, we present PPay, a micropayment system that exploits unique cha...
Beverly Yang, Hector Garcia-Molina
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 22 days ago
Recommender systems: a market-based design
Recommender systems have been widely advocated as a way of coping with the problem of information overload for knowledge workers. Given this, multiple recommendation methods have ...
Yan Zheng Wei, Luc Moreau, Nicholas R. Jennings
SAC
2006
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
Trading services in ontology-driven markets
In recent years, Web Services have become the key technology for building flexible and interoperable computing infrastructure. However, to realize the vision of a full-fletched ...
Steffen Lamparter, Björn Schnizler