8 search results - page 2 / 2 » Eliciting Bid Taker Non-price Preferences in (Combinatorial)... |
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 23 days ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
14 years 24 days ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
14 years 29 days ago
2004
ACM
We consider the parallels between the preference elicitation problem in combinatorial auctions and the problem of learning an unknown function from learning theory. We show that l...