We study the problem of coalitional manipulation in elections using the unweighted Borda rule. We provide empirical evidence of the manipulability of Borda elections in the form o...
Jessica Davies, George Katsirelos, Nina Narodytska...
In this paper, we set up a framework to study approximation of manipulation, control, and bribery in elections. We show existence of approximation algorithms (even fully polynomia...
Eric Brelsford, Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaan...
We investigate the computational aspects of safe manipulation, a new model of coalitional manipulation that was recently put forward by Slinko and White [11]. In this model, a pot...
Abstract. In this paper we consider a generalization of the edge dominating set (EDS) problem, in which each edge e needs to be covered be times and refer to this as the b-EDS prob...
We study the complexity of manipulation for a family of election systems derived from Copeland voting via introducing a parameter that describes how ties in head-to-head contests...
Piotr Faliszewski, Edith Hemaspaandra, Henning Sch...