83 search results - page 5 / 17 » Exact methods for combinatorial auctions |
FC
2004
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2004
Springer
This paper presents a secure Generalized Vickrey Auction (GVA) scheme that does not require third-party servers, i.e., the scheme is executed only by an auctioneer and bidders. Com...
GECCO
2005
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2005
Springer
Many non-cooperative settings that could potentially be studied using game theory are characterized by having very large strategy spaces and payoffs that are costly to compute. Be...
ICALP
2010
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2010
Springer
We study the combinatorial auction (CA) problem, in which m objects are sold to rational agents and the goal is to maximize social welfare. Of particular interest is the special ca...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 26 days ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...