Abstract. Most approaches to the formal analysis of cryptography protocols make the perfect cryptographic assumption, which entails for example that there is no way to obtain knowl...
Traditional password-based authentication and key-exchange protocols suffer from the simple fact that a single server stores the sensitive user password. In practice, when such a ...
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the co...
Abstract. We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. [BCPQ01,BCP01] and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol p...
Jens-Matthias Bohli, Maria Isabel Gonzalez Vasco, ...
Security-critical systems are an important application area for formal methods. However, such systems often contain cryptographic subsystems. The natural definitions of these subsy...