Sciweavers

119 search results - page 6 / 24
» Finite models for formal security proofs
Sort
View
TYPES
2004
Springer
14 years 26 days ago
A Machine-Checked Formalization of the Random Oracle Model
Abstract. Most approaches to the formal analysis of cryptography protocols make the perfect cryptographic assumption, which entails for example that there is no way to obtain knowl...
Gilles Barthe, Sabrina Tarento
CTRSA
2005
Springer
72views Cryptology» more  CTRSA 2005»
14 years 1 months ago
Proofs for Two-Server Password Authentication
Traditional password-based authentication and key-exchange protocols suffer from the simple fact that a single server stores the sensitive user password. In practice, when such a ...
Michael Szydlo, Burton S. Kaliski Jr.
SP
2006
IEEE
147views Security Privacy» more  SP 2006»
14 years 1 months ago
A Computationally Sound Mechanized Prover for Security Protocols
We present a new mechanized prover for secrecy properties of security protocols. In contrast to most previous provers, our tool does not rely on the Dolev-Yao model, but on the co...
Bruno Blanchet
IJISEC
2007
88views more  IJISEC 2007»
13 years 7 months ago
Secure group key establishment revisited
Abstract. We examine the popular proof models for group key establishment of Bresson et al. [BCPQ01,BCP01] and point out missing security properties addressing malicious protocol p...
Jens-Matthias Bohli, Maria Isabel Gonzalez Vasco, ...
FM
2006
Springer
153views Formal Methods» more  FM 2006»
13 years 11 months ago
Formal Methods and Cryptography
Security-critical systems are an important application area for formal methods. However, such systems often contain cryptographic subsystems. The natural definitions of these subsy...
Michael Backes, Birgit Pfitzmann, Michael Waidner