Abstract. Different auction-based approaches have been used to allocate resources in Grids, but none of them provide the design choice for a specific economic model while consideri...
In set-system auctions, there are several overlapping teams of agents, and a task that can be completed by any of these teams. The auctioneer's goal is to hire a team and pay...
Edith Elkind, Leslie Ann Goldberg, Paul W. Goldber...
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
We study the frugality ratio of truthful mechanisms in path auctions, which measures the extent to which truthful mechanisms “overpay” compared to non-truthful mechanisms. In p...
We study the complexity issues for Walrasian equilibrium in a special case of combinatorial auction, called single-minded auction, in which every participant is interested in only ...