d abstract) Prateek Gupta and Vitaly Shmatikov The University of Texas at Austin We present a cryptographically sound formal method for proving correctness of key exchange protoco...
Abstract. We present a formalism for the analysis of key-exchange protocols that combines previous definitional approaches and results in a definition of security that enjoys som...
We promote an engineering approach to design of provably secure key exchange protocols. Using the model of Canetti and Krawczyk we present a systematic method to arrive at efficie...
Yiu Shing Terry Tin, Colin Boyd, Juanma Gonz&aacut...
Modern multi-user communication systems, including popular instant messaging tools, social network platforms, and cooperative-work applications, offer flexible forms of communica...
Formal analysis of security protocols based on symbolic models has been very successful in finding flaws in published protocols and proving protocols secure, using automated too...