We provide efficient algorithms for finding approximate BayesNash equilibria (BNE) in graphical, specifically tree, games of incomplete information. In such games an agent’s p...
Satinder P. Singh, Vishal Soni, Michael P. Wellman
We study how to learn to play a Pareto-optimal strict Nash equilibrium when there exist multiple equilibria and agents may have different preferences among the equilibria. We focu...
This paper deals with two games defined upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium. ...
Finding approximate Nash equilibria in n × n bimatrix games is currently one of the main open problems in algorithmic game theory. Motivated in part by the lack of progress on wo...
We suggest that extending Muller games with preference ordering for players is a natural way to reason about unbounded duration games. In this context, we look at the standard solu...