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36

WINE
2009
Springer

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On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game

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On Strong Equilibria in the Max Cut Game

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This paper deals with two games deﬁned upon well known generalizations of max cut. We study the existence of a strong equilibrium which is a reﬁnement of the Nash equilibrium. Bounds on the price of anarchy for Nash equilibria and strong equilibria are also given. In particular, we show that the max cut game always admits a strong equilibrium and the strong price of anarchy is 2/3.

Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot

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Added	27 Jul 2010
Updated	27 Jul 2010
Type	Conference
Year	2009
Where	WINE
Authors	Laurent Gourvès, Jérôme Monnot

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