We consider markets in the classical Arrow-Debreu model. There are n agents and m goods. Each buyer has a concave utility function (of the bundle of goods he/she buys) and an init...
Abstract. Consider an “information market” where private and potentially sensitive data are collected, treated as commodity and processed into aggregated information with comme...
In third generation (3G) wireless data networks, repeated requests for popular data items can exacerbate the already scarce wireless spectrum. In this paper we propose an architec...
Michel X. Goemans, Erran L. Li, Vahab S. Mirrokni,...
The process of match formation in matching markets can be divided into three parts: information sharing, investments in information acquisition, and the formation of matches based...
Algorithms for determining quality/cost/price tradeoffs in saturated markets are consid-3 ered. A product is modeled by d real-valued qualities whose sum determines the unit cost ...
Joachim Gudmundsson, Pat Morin, Michiel H. M. Smid