In this paper we present a methodology for deciding the bidding strategy of agents participating in a significant number of simultaneous auctions, when finding an analytical sol...
Multi-agent games are becoming an increasingly prevalent formalism for the study of electronic commerceand auctions. The speed at which transactions can take place and the growing...
Satinder P. Singh, Michael J. Kearns, Yishay Manso...
To address coordination and complexity issues, we formulate a grid task allocation problem as a bargaining based self-adaptive auction and propose the BarSAA grid task-bundle alloc...
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
Abstract. We introduce take-it-or-leave-it auctions (TLAs) as an allocation mechanism that allows buyers to retain much of their private valuation information, yet generates close-...