35 search results - page 3 / 7 » Limits on the Social Welfare of Maximal-In-Range Auction Mec... |
GLOBECOM
2009
IEEE
14 years 5 months ago
2009
IEEE
— This paper studies an auction based allocation of network resources for short-term contracts for heterogeneous network services. The combinatorial winner selection yields the o...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
14 years 3 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the problem of selling identical goods to n unit-demand bidders in a setting in which the total supply of goods is unknown to the mechanism. Items arrive dynamically, and...
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
WINE
2009
Springer
14 years 5 months ago
2009
Springer
A well-known result due to Vickery gives a mechanism for selling a number of goods to interested buyers in a way that achieves the maximum social welfare. In practice, a problem wi...
PERCOM
2010
ACM
14 years 2 months ago
2010
ACM
—This paper studies economic models of user participation incentive in participatory sensing applications. User participation is the most important element in participatory sensi...