Abstract. Physical attacks on cryptographic implementations and devices have become crucial. In this context a recent line of research on a new class of side-channel attacks, calle...
Frederik Armknecht, Roel Maes, Ahmad-Reza Sadeghi,...
The design of cryptographic hash functions is a very complex and failure-prone process. For this reason, this paper puts forward a completely modular and fault-tolerant approach to...
We study the design of cryptographic primitives resilient to key-leakage attacks, where an attacker can repeatedly and adaptively learn information about the secret key, subject o...
Most of the work in the analysis of cryptographic schemes is concentrated in abstract adversarial models that do not capture side-channel attacks. Such attacks exploit various for...
Standard signature schemes are usually designed only to achieve weak unforgeability – i.e. preventing forgery of signatures on new messages not previously signed. However, most s...