The security of key agreement protocols has traditionally been notoriously hard to establish. In this paper we present a modular approach to the construction of proofs of security ...
In this paper we show that any two-party functionality can be securely computed in a constant number of rounds, where security is obtained against malicious adversaries that may ar...
Abstract. The Full Domain Hash (FDH) scheme is a RSA-based signature scheme in which the message is hashed onto the full domain of the RSA function. The FDH scheme is provably secu...
Abstract We propose several variants of a secure multiparty computation protocol for AES encryption. The best variant requires 2200 + 400 255 expected elementary operations in expe...
To prove that a secure key-agreement protocol exists one must at least show P = NP. Moreover any proof that the sequential composition of two non-adaptively secure pseudorandom fun...