Designing efficient bidding strategies for sequential auctions remains an important, open problem area in agent-mediated electronic markets. In existing literature, a variety of bi...
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
Designing revenue-optimal auctions for various settings is perhaps the most important, yet sometimes most elusive, problem in mechanism design. Spiteful bidders have been intensel...
We study auctions in which bidders have severe constraints on the size of messages they are allowed to send to the auctioneer. In such auctions, each bidder has a set of k possible...
Reserve price auctions are one of hot research topics in the traditional auction theory. Here we study the starting price in an online auction, counterpart of the public reserve pr...