44 search results - page 6 / 9 » Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders |
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
14 years 4 months ago
2004
ACM
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
AAAI
2007
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
FC
2003
Springer
14 years 4 months ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions have recently attracted the interest of many researchers due to their promising applications such as the spectrum auctions recently held by the FCC. In a com...
IJCAI
2001
14 years 8 days ago
2001
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...
AMAI
2005
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
2005
Springer
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...