44 search results - page 6 / 9 » Mechanism Design for Complexity-Constrained Bidders |
97
Voted
SIGECOM
2004
ACM
15 years 6 months ago
2004
ACM
Often, an outcome must be chosen on the basis of the preferences reported by a group of agents. The key difficulty is that the agents may report their preferences insincerely to m...
100
Voted
AAAI
2007
15 years 2 months ago
2007
Recent work on online auctions for digital goods has explored the role of optimal stopping theory — particularly secretary problems — in the design of approximately optimal on...
126
Voted
FC
2003
Springer
15 years 5 months ago
2003
Springer
Combinatorial auctions have recently attracted the interest of many researchers due to their promising applications such as the spectrum auctions recently held by the FCC. In a com...
99
Voted
IJCAI
2001
15 years 1 months ago
2001
Combinatorial auctions provide a valuable mechanism for the allocation of goods in settings where buyer valuations exhibit complex structure with respect to substitutabilityand co...
118
Voted
AMAI
2005
Springer
15 years 14 days ago
2005
Springer
We consider auction design in a setting with costly preference elicitation. Well designed auctions can help to avoid unnecessary elicitation while determining efficient allocations...