364 search results - page 36 / 73 » Mechanisms for Multi-Unit Auctions |
160
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ECWEB
2003
Springer
15 years 9 months ago
2003
Springer
Abstract. Combinatorial exchanges have attracted much attention recently. However, to this point there is no generally accepted payment allocation algorithm capable of clearing com...
127
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IPPS
2002
IEEE
15 years 9 months ago
2002
IEEE
In this paper, we present the overall design for an auctioning based resource trading/acquiring system that can be deployed in wide-area computing systems such as Grid systems. Se...
150
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SIGECOM
2008
ACM
15 years 4 months ago
2008
ACM
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
132
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ATAL
2004
Springer
15 years 9 months ago
2004
Springer
We investigate the design of iterative, limited-precision mechanisms for single-good auctions with dominant strategy equilibria. Our aim is to design mechanisms that minimize the ...
143
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SIGECOM
2003
ACM
15 years 9 months ago
2003
ACM
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can bid on bundles of items are known to be desirable auction mechanisms for selling items that are complementary and/or substitutable. Howev...