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CORR
2002
Springer
105views Education» more  CORR 2002»
13 years 10 months ago
Effectiveness of Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions where agents can bid on bundles of items are desirable because they allow the agents to express complementarity and substitutability between the items. Howe...
Benoît Hudson, Tuomas Sandholm
ATAL
2010
Springer
14 years 45 min ago
False-name-proofness with bid withdrawal
We study a more powerful variant of false-name manipulation in Internet auctions: an agent can submit multiple false-name bids, but then, once the allocation and payments have bee...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
CIA
2004
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
Auction Equilibrium Strategies for Task Allocation in Uncertain Environments
Abstract. In this paper we address a model of self interested information agents competing to perform tasks. The agents are situated in an uncertain environment while different tas...
David Sarne, Meirav Hadad, Sarit Kraus
WWW
2007
ACM
14 years 11 months ago
Netprobe: a fast and scalable system for fraud detection in online auction networks
Given a large online network of online auction users and their histories of transactions, how can we spot anomalies and auction fraud? This paper describes the design and implemen...
Shashank Pandit, Duen Horng Chau, Samuel Wang, Chr...
AIPS
2003
14 years 8 days ago
Economically Augmented Job Shop Scheduling
We present economically augmented job shop scheduling (EJSP) as an example of a coordination problem among selfinterested agents with private information. We discuss its signific...
Wolfram Conen