We study the role that privacy-preserving algorithms, which prevent the leakage of specific information about participants, can play in the design of mechanisms for strategic age...
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design Game. We present a classification of the entries to the competition, and use this classification to compare these ent...
Jinzhong Niu, Kai Cai, Simon Parsons, Peter McBurn...
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency Ph.D. dissertation, Univesity of Pennsylvania, May, 2001.
The focus of this chapter is on the Gen...