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» On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
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ICC
2009
IEEE
129views Communications» more  ICC 2009»
14 years 1 months ago
Random Access Protocols for WLANs Based on Mechanism Design
— In wireless local area networks (WLANs), quality of service (QoS) can be provided by mapping applications with different requirements (e.g., delay and throughput) into one of t...
Man Hon Cheung, Amir Hamed Mohsenian Rad, Vincent ...
IAT
2008
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
Beyond Quasi-linear Utility: Strategy/False-Name-Proof Multi-unit Auction Protocols
We develop strategy/false-name-proof multi-unit auction protocols for non-quasi-linear utilities. One almost universal assumption in auction theory literature is that each bidder ...
Yuko Sakurai, Yasumasa Saito, Atsushi Iwasaki, Mak...
ISIPTA
2005
IEEE
168views Mathematics» more  ISIPTA 2005»
14 years 8 days ago
Bayesianism Without Priors, Acts Without Consequences
: A generalization of subjective expected utility is presented in which the primitives are a finite set of states of the world, a finite set of strategies available to the decision...
Robert Nau
ATAL
2005
Springer
14 years 7 days ago
Mechanism design and deliberative agents
The central mechanism design problem is to develop incentives for agents to truthfully reveal their preferences over different outcomes, so that the system-wide outcome chosen by ...
Kate Larson, Tuomas Sandholm
SIGECOM
2003
ACM
143views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2003»
13 years 12 months ago
Differential-revelation VCG mechanisms for combinatorial auctions
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
Wolfram Conen, Tuomas Sandholm