Sciweavers

64 search results - page 12 / 13
» On Low-Envy Truthful Allocations
Sort
View
LATIN
2010
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
The Power of Fair Pricing Mechanisms
We explore the revenue capabilities of truthful, monotone (“fair”) allocation and pricing functions for resource-constrained auction mechanisms within a general framework that ...
Christine Chung, Katrina Ligett, Kirk Pruhs, Aaron...
SIGECOM
2000
ACM
227views ECommerce» more  SIGECOM 2000»
13 years 11 months ago
Combinatorial auctions for supply chain formation
Supply chain formation presents difficult coordination issues for distributed negotiation protocols. Agents must simultaneously negotiate production relationships at multiple lev...
William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Fredrik Ygge
CN
2007
111views more  CN 2007»
13 years 6 months ago
An auction mechanism for allocating the bandwidth of networks to their users
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
Manos Dramitinos, George D. Stamoulis, Costas Cour...
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 10 months ago
A prior-free revenue maximizing auction for secondary spectrum access
—Dynamic spectrum allocation has proven promising for mitigating the spectrum scarcity problem. In this model, primary users lease chunks of under-utilized spectrum to secondary ...
Ajay Gopinathan, Zongpeng Li
IOR
2011
96views more  IOR 2011»
12 years 10 months ago
An Ascending Vickrey Auction for Selling Bases of a Matroid
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when ...
Sushil Bikhchandani, Sven de Vries, James Schummer...