We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
Arpita Ghosh, Mohammad Mahdian, Daniel M. Reeves, ...
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Ev...
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish ag...
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...