149 search results - page 2 / 30 » On Mechanism Design without Payments for Throughput Maximiza... |
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2007
Springer
We introduce the concept of a trust network—a decentralized payment infrastructure in which payments are routed as IOUs between trusted entities. The trust network has directed ...
SIGECOM
2010
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2010
ACM
We study the design of truthful mechanisms that do not use payments for the generalized assignment problem (GAP) and its variants. An instance of the GAP consists of a bipartite g...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 8 months ago
2008
Springer
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
ISAAC
2007
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2007
Springer
Most of the recent works on algorithmic mechanism design exploit the solution concept of dominant strategy equilibria. Such work designs a proper payment scheme so that selfish ag...
WINE
2007
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2007
Springer
This paper characterizes the family of truthful doublesided auctions. Despite the importance of double-sided auctions to market design, to date no characterization of truthful dou...