Abstract. We provide a natural learning process in which the joint frequency of empirical play converges into the set of convex combinations of Nash equilibria. In this process, al...
—Aspnes et al [2] introduced an innovative game for modeling the containment of the spread of viruses and worms (security breaches) in a network. In this model, nodes choose to i...
V. S. Anil Kumar, Rajmohan Rajaraman, Zhifeng Sun,...
In this paper, we consider the development of single-timescale schemes for the distributed computation of Nash equilibria. In general, equilibria associated with convex Nash games ...
We study the impact of collusion in network games with splittable flow and focus on the well established price of anarchy as a measure of this impact. We first investigate symmet...
We introduce strategy logic, a logic that treats strategies in two-player games as explicit first-order objects. The explicit treatment of strategies allows us to specify properti...
Krishnendu Chatterjee, Thomas A. Henzinger, Nir Pi...