This paper considers a general setting for structured procurement and the problem a buyer faces in designing a procurement mechanism to maximize profit. This brings together two a...
Matthew Cary, Abraham D. Flaxman, Jason D. Hartlin...
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...
Combinatorial auctions, where bidders can submit bids on bundles of items, are economically efficient mechanisms for selling items to bidders, and are attractive when the bidders...
To address coordination and complexity issues, we formulate a grid task allocation problem as a bargaining based self-adaptive auction and propose the BarSAA grid task-bundle alloc...
The choice of a bidding language is crucial in auction design in order to correctly capture bidder utilities. We propose a new bidding model for the Adwords auctions of search eng...