This paper studies auctions in a setting where the di erent bidders arrive at di erent times and the auction mechanism is required to make decisions about each bid as it is receiv...
In this paper, we consider the problem of designing incentive compatible auctions for multiple (homogeneous) units of a good, when bidders have private valuations and private budg...
Sayan Bhattacharya, Vincent Conitzer, Kamesh Munag...
We consider the problem of designing mechanisms for online problems in which agents arrive over time and the mechanism is unaware of the agent until the agent announces her arriva...
We consider a problem where two selfish cognitive radio users try to share two channels on which they each have potentially different valuations. We first formulate the problem as ...
Hua Liu, Allen B. MacKenzie, Bhaskar Krishnamachar...
We study a representative task allocation problem called shortest paths: Let G be a graph in which the edges are owned by self interested agents. The cost of each edge is privatel...