This work initiates the study of cost-sharing mechanisms that, in addition to the usual incentive compatibility conditions, make it disadvantageous for the users to employ pseudon...
Paolo Penna, Florian Schoppmann, Riccardo Silvestr...
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...
This paper focuses on designing incentive mechanisms for overlay multicast systems. Existing proposals on the problem are no longer able to provide proper incentives when rational...
Service-level agreements (SLAs) establish a contract between service providers and clients concerning Quality of Service (QoS) parameters. Without proper penalties, service provid...
This paper proposes a novel auction-based mechanisms named Decreasing Cancellation Fee Auction (DCFA) for task allocation in the environment where a service provider has finite ca...