24 search results - page 3 / 5 » On revenue equivalence in truthful mechanisms |
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 27 days ago
2005
ACM
This paper concerns the design of mechanisms for online scheduling in which agents bid for access to a re-usable resource such as processor time or wireless network access. Each a...
CORR
2010
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experien...
ATAL
2006
Springer
13 years 11 months ago
2006
Springer
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
CN
2007
13 years 7 months ago
2007
We present a mechanism for auctioning bandwidth on a network-wide basis to end users or ISPs that will utilize it for the same time period. This mechanism consists of a set of sim...
IJCAI
2007
13 years 8 months ago
2007
We study the bidding behavior of spiteful agents who, contrary to the common assumption of selfinterest, maximize a convex combination of their own proļ¬t and their competitorsā...