Sciweavers

24 search results - page 4 / 5
» On revenue equivalence in truthful mechanisms
Sort
View
SODA
2004
ACM
128views Algorithms» more  SODA 2004»
13 years 8 months ago
Frugality in path auctions
We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
Edith Elkind, Amit Sahai, Kenneth Steiglitz
MFCS
2009
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
Private Capacities in Mechanism Design
Algorithmic mechanism design considers distributed settings where the participants, termed agents, cannot be assumed to follow the protocol but rather their own interests. The pro...
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano
INFOCOM
2011
IEEE
12 years 10 months ago
To preempt or not: Tackling bid and time-based cheating in online spectrum auctions
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
WINE
2010
Springer
164views Economy» more  WINE 2010»
13 years 4 months ago
Incentives in Online Auctions via Linear Programming
Online auctions in which items are sold in an online fashion with little knowledge about future bids are common in the internet environment. We study here a problem in which an auc...
Niv Buchbinder, Kamal Jain, Mohit Singh
AAAI
2007
13 years 9 months ago
Valuation Uncertainty and Imperfect Introspection in Second-Price Auctions
In auction theory, agents are typically presumed to have perfect knowledge of their valuations. In practice, though, they may face barriers to this knowledge due to transaction co...
David Robert Martin Thompson, Kevin Leyton-Brown