We consider the problem of picking (buying) an inexpensive s-t path in a graph where edges are owned by independent (selfish) agents, and the cost of an edge is known to its owner...
Algorithmic mechanism design considers distributed settings where the participants, termed agents, cannot be assumed to follow the protocol but rather their own interests. The pro...
—Online spectrum auctions offer ample flexibility for bidders to request and obtain spectrum on-the-fly. Such flexibility, however, opens up new vulnerabilities to bidder mani...
Lara B. Deek, Xia Zhou, Kevin C. Almeroth, Haitao ...
Online auctions in which items are sold in an online fashion with little knowledge about future bids are common in the internet environment. We study here a problem in which an auc...
In auction theory, agents are typically presumed to have perfect knowledge of their valuations. In practice, though, they may face barriers to this knowledge due to transaction co...