Auction mechanism design has traditionally been a largely analytic process, relying on assumptions such as fully rational bidders. In practice, however, bidders often exhibit unkn...
David Pardoe, Peter Stone, Maytal Saar-Tsechansky,...
Online reputation mechanisms need honest feedback to function effectively. Self interested agents report the truth only when explicit rewards offset the cost of reporting and th...
When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system from converging to a socia...
Let G = (4y2 + 2z)x2 + (10y2 + 6z) be the greatest common divisor (gcd) of two polynomials A, B ∈ [x,y, z]. Because G is not monic in the main variable x, the sparse modular ...
Jennifer de Kleine, Michael B. Monagan, Allan D. W...
This paper presents an effective strategy to extract the buildings and to reconstruct 3-D buildings using high-resolution multispectral stereo satellite images. Proposed scheme con...