56 search results - page 11 / 12 » Providing Reliable Agents for Electronic Commerce |
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 2 months ago
2009
ACM
Restricting the preferences of the agents by assuming that their utility functions linearly depend on a payment allows for the positive results of the Vickrey auction and the Vick...
SIGECOM
2009
ACM
14 years 2 months ago
2009
ACM
We study protocols to enable one user (the principal) to make potentially profitable but risky interactions with another user (the agent), in the absence of direct trust between ...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2005
ACM
The family of Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanisms is arguably the most celebrated achievement in truthful mechanism design. However, VCG mechanisms have their limitations. They...
ATAL
2005
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2005
Springer
Sequential auctions are an important mechanism for buying/selling multiple objects. Existing work has studied sequential auctions for objects that are exclusively either common va...
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 23 days ago
2003
Springer
This paper focuses on a task allocation problem, particularly in cases where the task is to find a solution to a search problem or a constraint satisfaction problem. If the searc...