We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn ...
Mohammad Taghi Hajiaghayi, Robert D. Kleinberg, Da...
The VCG mechanism is the canonical method for motivating bidders in combinatorial auctions and exchanges to bid truthfully. We study two related problems concerning the VCG mechan...
Combinatorial auctions (CAs) are important mechanisms for allocating interrelated items. Unfortunately, winner determination is NP-complete unless there is special structure. We s...
Vincent Conitzer, Jonathan Derryberry, Tuomas Sand...
Externalities are recognized to exist in the sponsored search market, where two co-located ads compete for user attention. Existing work focuses on the effect of another ad on th...
A combinatorial auction mechanism consists of an allocation rule that defines the allocation of goods for each agent, and a payment rule that defines the payment of each winner....
Taiki Todo, Atsushi Iwasaki, Makoto Yokoo, Yuko Sa...