Blinding is a popular and well-known countermeasure to protect public-key cryptosystems against side-channel attacks. The high level idea is to randomize an exponentiation in order...
Abstract. Physical computational devices leak side-channel information that may, and often does, reveal secret internal states. We present a general transformation that compiles an...
Sebastian Faust, Tal Rabin, Leonid Reyzin, Eran Tr...
Abstract. A cryptographic primitive is leakage-resilient, if it remains secure even if an adversary can learn a bounded amount of arbitrary information about the computation with e...
We develop a new notion of security against timing attacks where the attacker is able to simultaneously observe the execution time of a program and the probability of the values of...
Alessandra Di Pierro, Chris Hankin, Herbert Wiklic...
A cryptographic assumption is the (unproven) mathematical statement that a certain computational problem (e.g. factoring integers) is computationally hard. The leakage-resilience l...