Extensive games are a powerful model of multiagent decision-making scenarios with incomplete information. Finding a Nash equilibrium for very large instances of these games has re...
Martin Zinkevich, Michael Johanson, Michael H. Bow...
Finding an equilibrium of an extensive form game of imperfect information is a fundamental problem in computational game theory, but current techniques do not scale to large games...
The PPAD-completeness of Nash equilibrium computation is taken as evidence that the problem is computationally hard in the worst case. This evidence is necessarily rather weak, in ...
Multiagent Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes are a popular model of multiagent systems with uncertainty. Since the computational cost for finding an optimal joint pol...
We present an experimental investigation of the performance of the Lemke-Howson algorithm, which is the most widely used algorithm for the computation of a Nash equilibrium for bi...