We consider graphical games in which edges are zero-sum games between the endpoints/players; the payoff of a player is the sum of the payoffs from each incident edge. We give a si...
Constantinos Daskalakis, Christos H. Papadimitriou
We formalize a model for supervised learning of action strategies in dynamic stochastic domains and show that PAC-learning results on Occam algorithms hold in this model as well. W...
Market mechanisms solve distributed scheduling problems by allocating the scheduled resources according to market prices. We model distributed scheduling as a discrete resource al...
William E. Walsh, Michael P. Wellman, Peter R. Wur...
This paper presents an efficient method to reduce complexities of a linear network in s-domain. The new method works on circuit matrices directly and reduces the circuit complexi...
The inertia of an n × n matrix A is defined as the triple (i+(A), i−(A), i0(A)), where i+(A), i−(A), and i0(A) are the number of eigenvalues of A, counting multiplicities, w...