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» Strategic Deception in Agents
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AAAI
2010
13 years 11 months ago
Computationally Feasible Automated Mechanism Design: General Approach and Case Studies
In many multiagent settings, a decision must be made based on the preferences of multiple agents, and agents may lie about their preferences if this is to their benefit. In mechan...
Mingyu Guo, Vincent Conitzer
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
Towards a pareto-optimal solution in general-sum games
Multiagent learning literature has investigated iterated twoplayer games to develop mechanisms that allow agents to learn to converge on Nash Equilibrium strategy profiles. Such ...
Sandip Sen, Stéphane Airiau, Rajatish Mukhe...

Publication
208views
14 years 2 months ago
Tolerable Manipulability in Dynamic Assignment without Money
We study a problem of dynamic allocation without money. Agents have arrivals and departures and strict preferences over items. Strategyproofness requires the use of an arriva...
James Zou, Sujit Gujar, and David C. Parkes
ATAL
2010
Springer
13 years 10 months ago
Automated negotiation with decommitment for dynamic resource allocation in cloud computing
We consider the problem of allocating networked resources in dynamic environment, such as cloud computing platforms, where providers strategically price resources to maximize thei...
Bo An, Victor R. Lesser, David Irwin, Michael Zink
ICCCN
1998
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
HYDRANET : Network Support for Scaling of Large-Scale Services
With the explosive growth of demand for services on the Internet, the networking infrastructure (routers, protocols, servers) is under considerable stress. Mechanisms are needed f...
Hamesh Chawla, Geoff Dillon, Riccardo Bettati