We study rerouting policies in a dynamic round-based variant of a well known game theoretic traffic model due to Wardrop. Previous analyses (mostly in the context of selfish routi...
In a Stackelberg pricing game a leader aims to set prices on a subset of a given collection of items, such as to maximize her revenue from a follower purchasing a feasible subset o...
Patrick Briest, Martin Hoefer, Luciano Gualà...
In the theory of algorithmic randomness, one of the central notions is that of computable randomness. An infinite binary sequence X is computably random if no recursive martingale...
We consider the price of selfish routing in terms of tradeoffs and from an average-case perspective. Each player in a network game seeks to send a message with a certain length by...
It is self-evident that in numerous Multiagent settings, selfish agents stand to benefit from cooperating by forming coalitions. Nevertheless, negotiating a stable distribution of...