Abstract. In this paper we address a model of self interested information agents competing to perform tasks. The agents are situated in an uncertain environment while different tas...
Public electronic displays can be used as an advertising medium when space is a scarce resource, and it is desirable to expose many adverts to as wide an audience as possible. Alth...
Terry R. Payne, Esther David, Nicholas R. Jennings...
We consider collusion in multi-unit auctions where the allocation and payments are determined using the VCG mechanism. We show how collusion can increase the utility of the collud...
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
Nicole Immorlica, David R. Karger, Evdokia Nikolov...
A multi-agent marketplace, MAGNET (Multi AGent Negotiation Testbed), is a promising solution to conduct online combinatorial auctions. The trust model of MAGNET is somewhat diffe...