For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
We investigate the problem of allocating items (private goods) among competing agents in a setting that is both prior-free and paymentfree. Specifically, we focus on allocating mu...
We present PaDIS Emulator, a fully automated platform to evaluate CDN-ISP collaboration for better content delivery, traffic engineering, and cost reduction. The PaDIS Emulator e...
Ingmar Poese, Benjamin Frank, Simon Knight, Niklas...
We study a multi-unit auction with multiple bidders, each of whom has a private valuation and a budget. The truthful mechanisms of such an auction are characterized, in the sense ...
Christian Borgs, Jennifer T. Chayes, Nicole Immorl...
In this paper we describe a model in which artificial evolution is employed to design neural mechanisms that control the motion of two autonomous robots required to communicate th...