86 search results - page 7 / 18 » Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms |
WINE
2010
Springer
13 years 5 months ago
2010
Springer
We consider the following combinatorial auction: Given a range space (U, R), and m bidders interested in buying only ranges in R, each bidder j declares her bid bj : R R+. We give...
FOCS
2005
IEEE
14 years 1 months ago
2005
IEEE
We give a general technique to obtain approximation mechanisms that are truthful in expectation. We show that for packing domains, any α-approximation algorithm that also bounds ...
ATAL
2008
Springer
13 years 9 months ago
2008
Springer
This paper analyzes the entrants to the 2007 TAC Market Design competition. It presents a classification of the entries to the competition, and uses this classification to compare...
CORR
2008
Springer
13 years 7 months ago
2008
Springer
We consider the Offline Ad Slot Scheduling problem, where advertisers must be scheduled to sponsored search slots during a given period of time. Advertisers specify a budget constr...
FOCS
2003
IEEE
14 years 23 days ago
2003
IEEE
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...