Many important problems in multiagent systems can be seen as resource allocation problems. For such problems, the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is efficient, in...
A common objective in mechanism design is to choose the outcome (for example, allocation of resources) that maximizes the sum of the agents' valuations, without introducing in...
Krzysztof R. Apt, Vincent Conitzer, Mingyu Guo, Ev...
For the problem of allocating one or more items among a group of competing agents, the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is strategy-proof and efficient. However, the VCG mech...
There are p heterogeneous objects to be assigned to n competing agents (n > p)
each with unit demand. It is required to design a Groves mechanism for this assignment problem
s...