16 search results - page 3 / 4 » Vicious strategies for Vickrey auctions |
WECWIS
2003
IEEE
14 years 21 days ago
2003
IEEE
The paper analyzes auctions which are not completely enforceable. In such auctions, economic agents may fail to carry out their obligations, and parties involved cannot rely on ex...
ATAL
2003
Springer
14 years 20 days ago
2003
Springer
Auctions are useful mechanism for allocating items (goods, tasks, resources, etc.) in multiagent systems. The bulk of auction theory assumes that the bidders’ valuations for ite...
SIGECOM
2005
ACM
14 years 1 months ago
2005
ACM
We study first-price auction mechanisms for auctioning flow between given nodes in a graph. A first-price auction is any auction in which links on winning paths are paid their ...
ATAL
2007
Springer
14 years 1 months ago
2007
Springer
We derive optimal bidding strategies for a global bidding agent that participates in multiple, simultaneous second-price auctions with perfect substitutes. We first consider a mo...
AMMA
2009
Springer
14 years 2 months ago
2009
Springer
ABSTRACT: We examine an environment where goods and privately informed buyers arrive stochastically to a market. A seller in this setting faces a sequential allocation problem with...