Abstract. The central question in mechanism design is how to implement a given social choice function. One of the most studied concepts is that of truthful implementations in which...
Vincenzo Auletta, Paolo Penna, Giuseppe Persiano, ...
We study the problem of designing truthful algorithms for scheduling a set of tasks, each one owned by a selfish agent, to a set of parallel (identical or unrelated) machines in or...
We study the problem of finding the least-priced path (LPP) between a source and a destination in opportunistic spectrum access (OSA) networks. This problem is motivated by econo...
If models can be true, where is their truth located? Giere (e.g. 1988) has suggested an account of theoretical models on which models themselves are not truth-valued. The paper su...
This paper analyzes implementable social choice functions (in dominant strategies) over restricted domains of preferences, the leading example being combinatorial auctions. Our wo...