We present the first universally verifiable voting scheme that can be based on a general assumption (existence of a non-interactive commitment scheme). Our scheme is also the first...
Abstract. Let A and B denote cryptographic primitives. A (k, m)robust A-to-B combiner is a construction, which takes m implementations of primitive A as input, and yields an implem...
In a seminal paper, Feldman and Micali (STOC '88) show an n-party Byzantine agreement protocol tolerating t < n/3 malicious parties that runs in expected constant rounds. H...
In the setting of multiparty computation, a set of parties wish to jointly compute a function of their inputs, while preserving security in the case that some subset of them are co...
We present a robust multiparty computation protocol. The protocol is for the cryptographic model with open channels and a polytime adversary, and allows n parties to actively secur...